Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Robert E. Manning v. James M. Powers : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Willard Hanson; Stewart M. Hanson; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Manning v. Powers, No. 7276 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1023

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

/

In th,e

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RO,B ERT E. lVIANNING,
Plaint'if f and Appellant,

Case No.
727·6

vs.
JAMES M. POWERS,
Defenda,nt a,n,d Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Roald A.. Hogenson
~ ~
111 _j - ·:·

.lL1

1
',._

-n-

~
i~ '

l . A i:!J
r

Qt.·/ _- :.,---------

· ·''~'ILLARD HANSON,
STF.W ART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
ARGUMENT .................. .

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1-2

STATEMENT O·F FACTS .................... .
STATEMENT OF ERRORS ...... 0. 00.

5

Error No. 1. The verdict of the jury is· not
supported by the evidence, is contrary to the
great weight of the evidence and the court
erred in denying the motion for a new trial . 0 6 to 8
Error No. 2. The court erred in over-emphasizing and stressing the defense of contributory negligence 000. 00000000. 0000. 00. g. to 15
Error No. 3. The court erred in giving instruction No.4 . 0.. 000. 00. 00000000.. 00. 00. 000015 to19
Error No. 4. The court erred in failing to give
plaintiff's Request No. 6 0. 0000. 000. 0. 0.. 015· to 19
Error No. 5. The court erred in refusing to
give plaintiff's Request No. 4 0000000000. 019·to 22
°

Error No. 6. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 10 000 00000000. 00... 00.. 00.
22 to 25
°

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
T'ABLE OF ·CITATIONS

Page
39 American Jurisprudence Sec. 132, Page 142

7

Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1,
Pages 343 and 351, Sec. 152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Blashfield' s Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1,
Page 353, Sec. 154 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 12-13
Carter vs. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. (Texas) 160
s. w. 987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Condie vs. Rio Grande, 34 Utah 237, 97 P. 120 . . . . . . 13
Dennis vs. Stukey, 294 P. 276, 3·7 Ariz. 299 . . . . . . . .

8

Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 36 P. 848, 20 Colo. 107

8

Edwards vs. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P. (2d) 1021 . . . .

8

1

Freire vs. Kaupman, 281 N. Y. S. 408 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14·
Gesas vs. Oregon Short Line, 93 P. 274, 33 Utah 156 ... 16-17
Green vs. Higbee, 2·44 P. 906, 6·6 Utah 539 . . . . . . . . . . 21
Groesbeck vs. Lake Side Printing ·Co., 186 P. 103,
55 Utah 335 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Gulf Ry. ·Co. vs.' Harriett, 80 Texas 73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Hennessey Oil and Gas ~co. vs. Neeley, 162 P. 214,
62 Okla. 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Herald: vs. Smith, 190 P. 932, 56 Utah 304 ........ 17, 20,21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page
Ingram vs. Dunning, 159 P. 927, 60 Okla. 233

... 7-8

International and G. N. R. Co. vs. Newman, (Texas)
40 s. w. 854 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Kent vs. Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co., 167 P. 666, 50 Utah
323 .... · ........ ' ......... ' ' . ' .............. 10-11
Krann vs. Stockton Electric Co., 101 P. 914, 10 Cal.
App. 2'71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Loth-Hoffman ·Clothing Co. vs. Swartz, 176 P. 916,
74 Okla. 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Meachem vs. Hahn, 46 Ill. App. 149' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Porter vs. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 P. 153 . . . . . . . . . .

8

Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 431,
Page 774 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 432;,
Page 785....................................

13

Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, 3rd Ed., Vol.
1, Sec. 105, Pages 290, 291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Tidd vs. Railroad Co., 270 P. 138, 46 Idaho 652 . . . . . .

8

Valiotis vs. Utah Apex Mining Co., 184 P .. 802·, 52
Utah 151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Vidich vs. Occidental Mt. Benefits Ass'n., 196 P. 242,
108 Kansas 546 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

U. C. A. 1943, Sec. 57-7-122, subdivision (b) . . . . . . . .

23

U. C. A. 1943, Sec. 57-7-206, subdivision (a) ....... 23-24

Wiser vs. Copeland (Ariz.) 203 P. 565 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Woodward vs. Spring ·Canyon Coal ~Co., 63 P. (2d.)
26'7, 90 Utah 578 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Young Mining Co. vs. Bank, 296 P. 247, 37 Ariz. 521. .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ROBERT E. MANNING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

7276

JAMES M. POWERS,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
QUESTIONS. P'RESENTED
The questions presented by this appeal are briefly
this:
1. Is the driver of an automobile permitted to carelessly and negligently kill an eleven year old boy and
escape the consequences?
2. Will the verdict of a jury which exonerates the de-

fendant stand where the undisputed evidence shows that
he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the
death of the boy?
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3. Will not this ·Court in this ·case follow the same law
it has announced in innumberable cases in the past and
reverse the case where the trial court by his instructions
commits error prejudicial to the plaintiff?
· S:TA·TEMENT

O~F

FACTS

We will set forth the evidence with some detail that
this court may correctly answer the questions presented
here.
The testimony shows that the defendant left his home
in Brigham City on the early morning of October 6, 1947,
intending to drive to his employers place of business at
Murray, Utah. He was alone and was driving a maroon
colored 1946 Nash Sedan. He says he arrived at the Hot
Springs in Salt Lake ~City about 8 :40 A. M. The Springs
are about two miles north from where the accident happened. We have no testimony as to the speed he drove excepting immediately preceding the accident but he must
have driven at a rapid rate of speed since the accident
occurred within a few minutes of 8 :40. The defendant
testified that he first observed the decedent, Robert
Manning, the son of the plaintiff, Robert E. Manning,
coming out of a lane or driveway near the center of the
block between Sixth and Seventh South Streets on Second
West; that the boy turned south and rode his bicycle either
on the extreme westerly edge of the pavement or on the
shoulder of the road (Tr. 215). His testimony as to the
distance that he was from the boy at that time is variable.
-He testified that he was 3-0 or 40 feet a way and also said
that it might have been 60 or 70 feet away. He further
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testified that he was driving In the second lane next to
the center of the highway; that when Robert was almost
parallel with him he turned his bicycle without any warning
directly east and struck the rear of the right front fender
of the automobile and was thrown from the bicycle and
killed. He admitted that he gave no warning of the approach of his automobile and that he was traveling approximately 25 or 30 miles per hour. The defendant's
testimony is disproven not only by the physical facts but
by all the eye witneses to the accident.
The physical facts show that the rear mud guard of
the bicycle was struck by the right front fender of the car
near the headlight. ·The maroon color in the indentation
near the headlight w!J.ere it struck the bicycle was knocked
off and the maroon color paint from that fender was in the
indentation in the rear mud guard where it had been hit.
Ulrich Stark, a disinterested witness saw the accident and
testified that he saw Robert riding his bicycle in a southerly
direction and that he was either on the extreme westerly
edge of the pavement or on the shoulder next it; that he
saw the automobile strike the bicycle at the rear (Tr. 178180) and that the automobile was going at a speed of from
40 to 45 miles per hour (Tr. 190) and that no warning was
given of the approach of the automobile.
Mr. LeRoy Iverson, one of the officers investigating
the accident and who measured the brake marks of the
automobile, estimated the speed of the automobile from 40
to 45 miles per hour (Tr. 144).
Robert Barnett, a thirteen year old schoolmate of the
deceased, testified that he was standing on the east side of
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the street in front of the Jensen Tire Company Store at
665 South Second West; that Robert was riding his bicycle
either on the graveled part of the road or on the west part
of the cement pavement; that he was carrying his lunch;
that he called to Robert and sa~d, "Well, if it isn't Manning,"
(Tr. 305·) and that Robert took his left hand off the handlebar and waved to him; that Robert kept going south and
when he reached a point at the south side of the lane between 6:64 and 672 on Second West (those points are all
shown on Exhibit A, the map in question) the automobile
driven by the defendant struck the rear of the bicycle and
Robert was knocked off and fell to the pavement. (Q) And
the automobile did strike the back of the bicycle, didn't it?
(A) Yes, from what I could see. (Q) As far as you could
see the automobile hit the bicycle right back here (indicating
the dent in the rear mud guard) didn't it? (A) Yes (Tr.
307). Robert was not going very fast and I didn't hear the
sounding of the horn (Tr. 308).
The other testimony does not change the foregoing
facts. Boys who were in close proximity to the accident
but did not see the actual striking of the bicycle by the automobile testified that they saw Robert riding his bicycle
either on the west side of the paved portion of Second West
or immediately on the shoulder and that as he proceeded
south Bobby Barnett called to him and that Robert waved
his left hand and continued riding; that there were two
cars parked on the west side of the highway in close proximity to the paved portion and that as Robert approached
them he turned his bicycle slightly easterly as though to
pass them and then was struck by the automobile. They all
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testified that no warning was given whatever of the approach of the automobile.
The body of the boy, when it finally came to rest was
laying partly on the paved portion and partly on the
shoulder with the bicycle close by. The lunch which the
boy was carrying was scattered about along the shoulder
and in close proximity to the bicycle.
After the accident an examination of the car disclosed
not only the dent in the right front fender which struck the
rear of the bicycle but the handle of the car was bent and
the dust had been wiped off the right front door. No doubt
the boy was thrown into the air by the impact and as the
body came down it swung back against the door, bent the
handle and wiped some of the dust off the side of the car
(Tr. 230). The collision, of course, bent the frame of the
bicycle as well as damaging it otherwise.
STATEMENT OF ER.RORS
1. The verdict of the jury is not supported by the evi-

dence, is contrary to the great weight of the evidence and
the Court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.
2. The court erred in over-emphasizing and stressing
the defense of contributory negligence.
3. The court erred in giving its instruction No. 4.
4. The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's re-

quest No. 6.
5. The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's request No. 4.
6. The court erred in giving its instruction No. 10.
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ARGUMENT
ERROR NO.1
T·HE VERDJ:CT OF THE JURY IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE, IS CON'TRARY TO THE GREAT
WEIGHT O·F T'HE E·VIDENCE AND THE COURT
ERRED IN DENYING T'HE MOTlON F'OR A NEW
TRIAL.
Our statement of what the evidence shows makes it
clear that the over-whelming weight of the evidence is to
the effect that that defendant was guilty of negligence which
solely and proximately caused the death of Robert. We are
firmly convinced that the defendant did not see Robert until
about the time the collision occurred. However, he says he
was· watching the boy as he proceeded along the highway
yet he never gave him any warning of the approach of the
automobile. He didn't see the boy take his hand off the
handlebars and wave to the Barnett boy across the street.
This was seen by all the other boys. He says that when
Robert was parallel with him that the boy turned his bicycle
directly into the side of the automobile. This is disputed
not only by the physical facts but by every other. witness
in the case. The deposition of .the defendant was taken
prior to the trial and in that deposition the defendant testified that when he first noticed the boy he was 30 feet ahead
of him (Tr. 232~2;34). Yet at the trial he changed that to
70 feet. He testified in his deposition that he saw the front
wheel hit the car and heard the impact of the body when it
hit the car (Tr. 235) and that the only marks on the car were
a black rubber mark on the side and a dent below the handle
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and that there were no other marks on the car (Tr. 236,
237). Yet he knew at the time he was testifying at the
deposition that there was a mark near the front head light
and that it had been pointed out to him by the officer and
that the maroon paint had been scraped therefrom and that
the dent in the rear of the bicycle had maroon paint on it.
The only place that paint was removed from the car was
from the front of the fender near the headlight where it
struck the wheel. The physical evidence clearly shows
that the testimony of the defendant that the boy turned
his bicycle into the side of the car is untrue. Those that
saw the collision testified that the front of the car struck
the rear of the bicycle. The evidence clearly shows such to
be the fact. That the bicycle was struck from the rear cannot be denied. Such being the fact, the defendant, of course,
was negligent and should be made to respond in damages.
The rule is almost universal that where the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the verdict or where the verdict
is contrary to the evidence, a new trial should be granted.
"Where the evidence offered for the party for
whom a verdict has been rendered, conceding to it
the greatest probative force to which, according to
the laws of evidence, it is fairly entitled, is insufficient to support or to justify the verdict, it is the
duty of the court to set it aside and grant a new
trial." 39 Amer. Juris. Sec. 132, Page 142.
The trial court should have unhesitatingly granted a
new trial and committed error in denying the motion.
"Where a verdict is not sustained by sufficient
evidence or is based on conjecture, a new trial should
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be granted." Ingram vs. Dunning, 159 Pac. 927, 60
Okl. 233.
"Where the verdict is manifestly against the
weight of the evidence, it should be set aside, and a
new trial granted." Young Mining Co. vs. Bank, 296
Pac. 247, 37 Arizona 521.
"New trial should be granted if evidence accredited by jury is improbable and probably untrue."
Dennis vs. Stukey, 294 Pac. 276, 37 Arizona 299·.
"Where a verdict contrary to strong and persuasive testimony was supported chiefly by interested and distrustful evidence, the case calls for the
vigorous exercise of the trial courts prerogative to
set it aside." Vidich vs. O·ccidental Mt. Benefits
Ass'n, 196 Pac. 242, 108 Kan. 546·.
See also Loth-Hoffman Clothing ~Co. vs. Swartz,
176 Pac. 916, 7 4 Okl. 18.. Krann vs. Stockton Electric 'Company, 101 Pac. 914, 10 Cal. App. 271. Denver
Tramway Company vs. Owens, 36 Pac. 848, 20 Colo.
107. T'idd vs. Railroad Co., 270 Pac. 138, 46 Idaho
H52. Hennessey Oil and Gas Co. vs. Neely, 162: Pac.
214, 62 Okl. 101.
The testimony of the defendant and that of Bobby
Barnett, the defendant's witness, is of no greater value to
the defendant than as is shown on their cross examination.
In this connection see the case of Porter vs. Hunter (60
Utah 222, 20'7 Pac. 153) and Edwards vs. Clark (96, Utah
121, 83. Pac. Second, Page 1021) wherein this court has held
"that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than as
shown by the cross-examination."

.

ERROR NO.2
THE CO,URT' ERRED IN OVER-EMPHASIZING
AND S.TRESSING T'HE DEF'ENSE O~F CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.
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The defendant in his answer alleged that Robert was
guilty of contributory negligence and set forth in his answer
nine separate purported acts of contributory negligence.
Five of the purported acts of contributory negligence all
go to one and the saJ.11e proposition, to-wit, that the deceased
child turned in front of the defendant's automobile. In
addition to setting forth that the deceased child turned into
defendant's automobile the defendant also alleged that the
deceased child failed to keep a lookout, failed to have control of his bicycle so as to avoid a collision and failed to
use ordinary care to avoid the collision.
The court in summarizing the pleadings in its instruction No. 1 specified each of the eight alleged grounds of
~ontributory negligence. In instruction No. 4, the court
again referred to the alleged contributory negligence upon
the part of t~e deceased and stated that if the deceased contributed in any degree to the collision, then the plaintiff
could not recover. The court further, in instruction No. 4,
attempted to define contributory negligence so far as it
pertains to a child. The court erred in this particular, which
will be discussed hereafter. The court again in instruction
No.5 referred to the contributory negligence of the deceased,
stating again that if the deceased was negligent in any of
the particulars alleged in the answer, the plaintiff could
not recover.
Then in instructions 6, 7, 8 and 9, the court defined the
duty of a motorist driving along and upon the highway.
Then, in instruction No. 10, the court qualified its instruc-
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tion No. 8, and stated that the sounding of a horn in passing was a matter of discretion with the operator of the
motor vehicle.
The plaintiff's theory is set forth in instructions 6, 7,
8 and 9, but qualified by instruction No. 10.
In instruction No. 11, the court again refers to the
contributory negligence of the deceased and states that if
the deceased were guilty of contributory negligence in any
particular, the plaintiff could not recover. In instructions
Nos. 12; 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, the court repeats each of
the alleged acts of contributory negligence as alleged in
the answer of the defendant; and repeatedly states that if
the deceased did the parti<:ular act as set forth in said instructions, Nos. 12 to 17, that the plaintiff could not recover.
'The court gives four instructions on the plaintiff's
theory of the case then qualifies one of them by instruction
No. 10, and gives ten instructions repeatedly stating in effect that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence
and impressing upon the minds of the jurors that that was
the sole issue involved in the case.
The continual repetition on the part of the court emphasizing the particular acts which the defendant alleged
constituted contributory negligence on the part of the deceased was error.
In Kent v. Ogden L. & I. Railway Co., 167 P. 666, 50
Utah 328, the court held that in charging on contributory
negligence, the lower court should not undertake to name
the specific things or acts which the jury may consider, but
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should merely tell the jury to consider the evidence upon
that subject and determine the question from a ,consideration of the whole evidence, and at p. 341 of the Utah Reports
further held that:
"While it is true that the plaintiff in a negligence case must recover, if at all, on one or more of
the acts of negligence set forth in his complaint, yet
in determining the question of contributory negligence, the jury are not limited to the acts of negligence described in the complaint but they may consider any fact, inference or circumstance disclosed
by the evidence upon that subject."
The court further held :
"It is always dangerous for a court to single
out specific things or acts in charging the jury."
the last quotation particularly relating to a charge on contributory negligence.
In Valiotis v. Utah Apex Mining Co., 184 P. 80~, 52
Utah 151, the court held that it is improper for the trial
court in its instructions to single out certain facts which the
evidence tended to prove, and that the lower court in that
case properly refused an instruction which singled out
certain facts, holding that to do so invaded the province
of the jury.
See also International & G. N. R. Co. v. Newman,
(Texas), 40 S. W. 854, wherein the court held that an instruction singling out a particular act and stating it would
not constitute proper care where the issue involved was
contributory negligence, was improper. So, in the case at
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bar wherein the court in five of the instructions stated that
if the deceased turned his bicycle from the path in which he
was riding at the time of the accident in question and into
the defendant's car that the plaintiff could not recover,
would be error in view of the foregoing authorities in
singling out one issue and prominently placing it before
the jury.
See also Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed.
Vol. 1, p. 343, and p. 351. In Sec. 152 of the same volume,
the author states:
"It is improper for the court to place too prominently before the jury any principle of law involved
in the case as by frequent repetition. Where a number of instructions announce in varying language a
single rule of law, the effect is to unduly impress a
single principle announced upon the jury's minds
to the exclusion perhaps of other equally important
principles."
And in Carter v. Missouri K. & T. Railway Co., (Texas)
160 S. W. 987, the court held that repeated reference to what
defenses of the defendant will defeat recovery is improper
and erroneous. In Meachem v. Hahn, 46 Ill. App. 149, the
court held it is error to refer repeatedly to a fact or facts in
evidence, as this is calculated to give undue prominence
to such testimony.
See also Gulf Railway Co. v. Harriett, 80 Texas 73.
In Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1,
Sec. 154, p. 353, the author states:
"that a defendant has the right to demand the
giving of a charge based upon a specified group of
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facts which if found to be true would constitute a
good defense, but this rule cannot be held to authorize
or require the giving of numerous charges upon a
single fact or group of facts constituting a single
defense, merely because such charges are deftly
phrased, and the practice of singling out one among
several important issues and submitting it to the
jury is imp.roper."
In Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 431, p.
774, the author states:
"It is improper to single out a particular issue
or defense so as to impress the jury with the idea that
it is the controlling one-or to emphasize the theory
of one party as compared with the theory of his adversary."
The lower court in the· case at bar in giving ten instructions on the contributory negligence of the deceased
over-emphasized the defendant's theory and without question influenced the jury in favor of the defendant.
In Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 432,
p. 785, the author states that instructions singling out
certain facts bearing on an issue and telling the jury that
they may or should consider such facts in determining
such issue, although the jury are also told they should consider such facts along with all the other evidence, are
erroneous or properly refused.
See also Condie v. Rio Grande, 34 U. 237, 97 P. 120,
wherein the court held that it would be error to single out an
isolated fact in a charge to the jury and that refusal to
give such a charge was proper.
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Reid's Branson Instruction to Juries, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1,
Sec. 105, pp. 290 and 291, states the law to the same purport
and cites many cases to the effect that an instruction which
lays especial stress upon certain features of the case in such
a way as to take the jury's attention from other phases upon
which there might be a recovery should not be given, even
though they assert a correct principle of law, and further
that objectionable prominence occur~ where the court unnecessarily stresses the question of contributory negligence.
See Freire v. Kaupman, 281 N. Y. S. 408.
See also Wiser v. Copeland, (Ariz.), 203 P. 5,65, wherein the court held an instruction which laid undue stress on
one fact to the exclusion of all others proper to be considered
in determining the issue of negligence erroneous, and the
court laid particular stress and emphasis upon the defendant's rights without relation to the rights of the plaintiff.
The court in that case, which was a negligence case, involving the use of the highway, instructed the jury that the
defendant had the right to use the right-hand side of the
highway, or any portion thereof, and failed to state to the
jury the duties the defendant owed to the plaintiff in his
use of the right portion of said highway, and over-emphasized the defendant's rights without relation to the plaintiff's rights; this the court said was error.
It is obvious from the foregoing authorities that the
court in instructing the jury in the case at bar, not only
over-emphasized the matter of contributory negligence, but
failed, in instructing the jury on the question of contributory
negligence, to inform them of the plaintiff's rights in this
connection.
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ERROR NO.3

THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 4,
AND
ERROR NO.4
THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAIN·TIFF'S REQUEST NO. 6
Both Errors Nos. 3 and 4 may be considered together,
both going to the proper manner of instructing the jury as
to the contributory negligence of a minor.
The court in its instruction No. 4 gave the following
instruction:
"You are instructed that if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the deceased child,
Robert Manning, was contributorily negligent in
one or more of the particulars alleged by the defendant, and that such negligence, if any, on his
part proximately caused and contributed in any degree to the collision and his death, then the plaintiff
cannot recover in this case, regardless of the negligence, if any, of the defendant, and each of the following instructions regarding the right, if any, of
the plaintiff to recover is subject to this qualification.
''You are instructed in this connection that said
Robert Manning was under a duty to exercise that
degree of care for his own safety which would ordinarily be used by an ordinarily prudent boy of the
same age, capacity, and experience.
"The age, capacity and experience of the said
Robert Manning are factors which you may take
into consideration together with all of the evidence
in the case in determining whether or not the defendant was negligent, so far as such factors were
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known to or in the exercise of ordinary care could
have been seen by the defendant, or the said Robert
Manning was contributorily negligent in accordance
with these instructions.
"Each of the participants in the collision are
presumed to have acted as reasonably prudent persons until proof is made."
In the above instruction the court stated that if the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence he could
not recover. Then, in paragraph 2 of the instruction the
court attempted to qualify its previous statement as to contributory negligence by stating that the deceased was under
a duty to exercise that degree of care for his own safety
which would ordinarily be used by an ordinarily prudent
boy of the same age, capacity and experience. This qualification is to some extent true. But in paragraph 3 of the
instruction, the court goes on to say that the age, capacity
and experience of the deceased were factors which the jury
might consider in determining the defendant's negligence,
so far as such factors were known to the defendant. This, of
course, was a gross error on the part of the court and was
not a correct statement of the law as has been laid down
by this Honorable Court. The age, capacity and experience
of the child are rna tters which the jury are to take into
consideration in determining whether or not the child was
guilty of contributory negligence. It is not how the age,
capacity and experience appear to the defendant.
In Gesas v. Oregon Short Line, 93 P. 2·74, 33 Utah 156,
the court at p. 174, lays down the rule that a child is not
negligent or contributorily negligent if he exercises that
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degree of care which, under like circumstances would be
expected of one of his years and capacity.
In Herald v. Smith, 190 P. 932, 56 Utah 304, the court
held at p. 308 of the Utah Reports that:
"The degree of care required of a child must be
graduated to its age, capacity and experience, and
must be measured by what might ordinarily be expected from a child of like age, capacity and experience under similar conditions. If it acted as
might reasonably be expected of , such a child, it
cannot be charged with contributory negligence."
The court in so holding quoted the above referred to
Gesas case and also the case of Groesbeck v. Lake Side Printing Co., 186 P. 103, 55 Utah 335.
It is for the jury to determine whether the child in
question did what might ordinarily be expected from a child
of like age, capacity and experience under similar conditions.
It is not how the age, ·capacity and experience appeared or
were known to the defendant. In the court's instruction No.
4, the court states that the jury may consider the age,
capacity and experience, and then qualifies that statement in
paragraph 3 by stating that it is for the jury to con~ider
these factors so far as they appeared to the defendant. Such
is not a correct statement of the law. The court is confusing
the factors the jury should consider in determining the contributory negligence of a child with the degree of care
which the defendant owes to the child when the defendant
knows a child is involved.
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The plaintiff in his requests for instructions requested
the court to give the following instruction, going to the contributory negligence of the decease~ child :
"You are instructed that the defendant contends
that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence and in the particulars set forth in the defendant's answer, and that such acts upon the part of
the deceased were the sole cause or contributed to
any accident to him and his death; in such respect
the court charges you that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, it is presumed that the deceased exercised due care ·for his o,wn safety. The general·
rule as to an adult, if it be shown that he was guilty
of negligence which directly and proximately contributed to an accident and injury sustained by him
bars recovery for damages by him for any injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another, or
in case of his death, recovery by his beneficiary. But,
the same conduct and degree of care required of an
adult to be exercised by him for his own safety does
not in full force apply to a child of 11 years of age.
Such a child or person is required to exercise only
that degree of care and caution which persons of
like age, ·capacity, experience and intelligence might
be reasonably expected to naturally and ordinarily
use under the same situation and like circumstances;
thus, in determining whether the deceased was negligent, as in the answer of the defendant alleged, you
are entitled to and should take into consideration
the age of the deceased, his experience and intelligence, and his knowledge and appreciation of danger
incident to riding his bicycle along the street in
question, and if upon all the evidence in the case,
you find that the deceased exercised such care and
caution as naturally would be expected from a boy
of like age, experience and intelligence under similar
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circumstances and conditions, then you will find
that the deceased was not guilty of contributory
negligence."
The above request is a correct stateme·nt of the law as
is set forth in the above quoted decisions from this Honorable Court.

ERROR NO.5
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST NO·. 4
The plaintiff requested the court to give the following
request:
''You are instructed that it is undisputed that
the defendant Powers in driving along and upon the
highway at the time and place in question observed
the deceased, Robert ·Manning, proceeding along and
upon the highway in front of him upon his bicycle,
that he intended to pass him and that he knew at
said time that the deceased was a young boy. You
are instructed that the degree of care to be exercised
by the driver of an automobile is greater when the
safety of a child or children is concerned, and when
such facts are known to the operator of the automobile; and it is for you to determine whether or
not Mr. Powers exercised that degree of care and
caution at the time and place in question as would
be exercised by an ordinary prudent person under
the same circumstances, and if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that in passing the deceased, the defendant failed to exercise that degree
of care and caution as an ordinary prudent person
would exercise in passing a young boy on a bicycle,
and the failure to exercise that degree of care was
the sole, proximate cause of the accident in question,
then your verdict would be in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant."
·
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Nowhere in the court's instructions did the court define
the duty of the defendant when the presence of children was
involved. The above request made by the plaintiff defines
the duty of an automobilist driving along and upon a highway when the presence and safety of children are concerned.
The court in its instruction No. 4 (supra) (referred to in
the discussion of Errors 3 and 4) , in attempting to define
what factors should be considered in determining whether
or not a child was contributorily negligent confused those
factors with the duty of a motorist when the presence of
children was concerned. The defendant in the case at bar
admitted on cross-examination that he saw and knew the
deceased was a young boy and that he was riding a bicycle.
Knowing these facts, it was incumbent upon the defendant
to exercise a higher or greater degree of care along and
upon the highway in question and in attempting to pass the
deceased.
This Honorable ,Court has held in many cases that
children are prone to be less mindful of danger than are
persons of mature years, and for that reason a greater degree of care is required of a person who drives an automobile in close proximity to children than is required in
driving in close proximity to mature persons.
In the case of Herald v. Smith, 190 P. 932, 56 U. 304,
the court says at p. 309 of the Utah Reports, that the
operator of an automobile is only required to exercise ordinary care or such care as an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise under like or similar circumstances, and as
indicated,
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"The degree of care required to be exercised will
be greater when the safety of children or others of
immature judgment is involved and such facts are
known to the operator of the car."
The court in its instruction No.4 (supra) confused the
above statement of law with the definition of contributory
negligence involving a child.
This court followed the above rule in the cases of
Green v. Higbee, 244 P. 906, 66 U. 539, and in Woodward
v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 63 P. (2d) 267, 90 U. 578.
In the Woodward case at p. 271 (Pacific Reporter) this
court says:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that children are prone to be less mindful of danger than are
persons of mature years. For that reason, a greater
degree of care is required of a person who drives an
automobile in close proximity to children than is
required in driving in close proximity to mature
persons."
The court should have separately and as requested by
the plaintiff in his request No. 6 (supra) stated to the jury
the matters and things they should consider in determining
contributory negligence on the part of a child, and then
should have instructed the jury as to the duty of the defendant at all times towards the child when the defendant
knew that the deceased, which it is undisputed in this case
that he knew, was a child. In other words, the court in instruction No. 4 told the jury that they ,could consider the
age, capacity and experience of the deceased child in determining contributory negligence but qualified the state-
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ment by stating "so far as those things appeared to the
defendant." As stated before, nowhere in the court's instructions does the court instruct the jury that a higher
degree is owing to a child than to a mature person, and this
should certainly have been given to the jury when it was
admitted by the defendant that he knew the deceased was
a child.
We respectfully call this Honorable Court's attention
to the court's instructions Nos. 11 to and including 17. The
examination of those instructions will reveal that the duty
placed upon the deceased child is the duty required of an
adult person, and although the instructions might be correct
statements of the law so far as they pertain to adult persons, they are not a correct statement of the law so far as
they pertain to the case at bar. If the court insisted upon
repeating contributory negligence in each of the above referred to instructions, as it did, then the court should have
modified each of them by stating that they could only consider the deceased contributorily negligent after they had
taken into account his age, intelligence and experience.
ERROR NO.6
THE c·oURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 10
The court correctly stated the law in its instruction
No. 8, wherein the court instructed the jury that a person
driving an automobile coming from the rear shall by audible
signal indicate his intention to pass a vehicle proceeding
in front of him, and that failure to give an audible signal
of intention to pass constitutes negligence. Then, in instruction No. 10, the court instructed as follows :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
"You are instructed that the law of this state
pertaining to the requirement of sounding a horn
on a motor vehicle does not require the use of a horn
in passing, if the driver of a vehicle intends to pass
another vehicle under any and all circumstances.
Therefore the question of sounding the horn is a
matter which is left to the sound judgment of the
operator of the motor vehicle in the exercise of ordinary care, and the failure to sound a horn immediately prior to the happening of an accident does not
consistute negligence as a matter of law."
The above quoted instruction is not only contrary to
law, but is in direct conflict with instruction No. 8. Instruction No. 10 (supra) leaves the matter of sounding the
horn to the sound judgment of the operator of the motor
vehicle. This of course is absolutely contrary to the laws
of Utah. Section 57-7-122, subdivision (b) U. ·C. A., 1943,
provides as follows :
"Except when overtaking and passing on the
right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed
by the overtaking vehicle."
Section 57-7-206, subdivision (a) U. C. A., 1943, provides as follows :
"Every motor vehicle when operated upon a
highway shall be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible
under normal conditions from a distance of not less
than 200 feet, but no horn or other warning device
shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or
a whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall when

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give
audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway.
The first section of the Code referred to provides that
overtaken vehicles shall give the right of way on audible
signal. ;The statute does not leave the matter to the sound
discretion of the person overtaking, but makes it mandatory
upon him to give an audible signal before passing. 'The second section of the statute above referred to makes it mandatory upon the operator of an automobile to sound his horn
when reansonably necessary to insure safe operation, and
certainly where children are involved a horn is always required to be sounded in passing them in order to warn of the
approach of the on coming vehicle and to insure them the
safety they are entitled to.
It is for the jury to decide whether it was necessary to
give a warning at the time and place of the accident in
question and not a matter to be left to the sound judgment
of the defendant.
Instruction No. 10 (supra) not only invades the province of the jury but is in direct conflict with both of the
above referred to statutes. It is not for the driver of the
automobile to determine whether it is reasonably necessary
to sound a horn, but it is for the jury to determine upon all
the facts and circumstances in the case whether or not the
person who is being overtaken is a person of rna ture years
or is a child, and as stated before where a child is involved
a higher degree of care is required and that degree of care
is only exercised when a horn is sounded while passing a
child.
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We respectfully submit that the court erred in its instructions given; in its refusing to instruct as requested by
plaintiff, and in overruling and denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial, and that the judgment of the jury and court
should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLARD HANSO·N,
STEWART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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